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PHILOSOPHY AND LAW: SOME 
OBSERVATIONS ON MacCORMICK'S 
LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL 
THEORY 
Patricia .D. White* 
LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL THEORY. By Neil MacCormick. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1978. Pp. xi, 298. $14.95. 
There are at least two reasons why any book on the philosophy of 
law that seeks to interest both nonlawyer philosophers and 
nonphilosopher lawyers runs the serious risk of interesting no one. 
On the one hand, the effort not to alienate either group, either by 
using the other group's jargon or by presuming some general sophis-
tication in the other field, can easily produce a work that seems tedi-
ous to those readers who are fairly well versed in one field or the 
other. And on the other hand, the very effort to say something inter-
esting to each group may nonetheless require that some substantial 
background in each subject be presumed, thus causing the alienation 
sought to be prevented. The irony, of course, is that the one class of 
people that might reasonably be expected to be very interested in the 
subject - lawyer philosophers - is doubly alienated, yet the total 
class of interested readers is increased only slightly, if at all. As a 
general proposition it is more effective, I suspect, to eschew any 
temptation to increase one's readership and instead to adopt the tone 
best suited for one's most natural audience. 
Professor MacCormick's book should be of interest to serious 
philosophers of law, but it is so critically flawed by MacCormick's 
attempt to ''write it in such a way that it will be comprehensible to 
non-philosophical lawyers and to non-lawyer philosophers" (p. v) 
that many may not have the patience to read it through. Mac-
Cormick falls into both of the traps described above. Long stretches 
of the book, especially early on, are so tedious as to be virtuallly 
unreadable by anyone with a modicum of philosophical sophistica-
tion; yet much of the later discussion assumes to quite a remarkable 
degree, given the purported aim of the book, that the reader is famil-
iar with the work of H.L.A. Hart and Ronald Dworkin. Without 
that familiarity and without a more general background in moral 
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philosophy, it would be difficult indeed to understand MacCormick's' 
motivation and to appreciate the interest of what he has to say. 
MacCormick wants to explain the nature of legal argument and 
its role in legal theory. However, he regards that project as crucially 
linked to a broader inquiry into the role of reason in the determina-
tion of human action. The fact that much "practical reasoning" in 
the legal sphere occurs publicly during the process of legal adjudica-
tion seems to MacCormick to make the study of legal argument an 
especially important vehicle for gaining insight into the nature of 
practical reason in general (pp. 19, 272-74).1 
In rough and oversimplified outline, MacCormick's thesis is that 
although some legal decisions are logically implied by the conjunc-
tion of general legal rules with particular findings of fact,2 very often 
(perhaps even most often?) no set of commonly accepted general le-
gal rules is sufficiently clear, either in terms or in scope, to compel 
any particular decision (pp. 65-72).3 When this happens, a judge 
must frame his own justificatory general legal rule: one that would 
have compelled the actual decision in the case and that wiff compel a 
similar decision in any indistinguishable future case (pp. 74-76, 81-
I. MacCormick seems to regard practical reasoning as the method by which people deter-
mine at any time and in any context what they ought to do. He makes no attempt to distin-
guish among the various senses of"ought" that might be distinguished (e.g., "I ought to put on 
my sweater (because I feel chilly)," "I ought to drive on the right hand side of the road (be-
cause the traffic laws require me to)," "I ought to apologize to my mother (because I broke her 
favorite vase)," "I ought," said the judge, ''to sentence this man to jail for the maximum term 
(because he is particularly despicable and I am the person required to pronounce his sen-
tence)"). Instead he speaks of "any mode of evaluative argument" (p. 5). 
An account of practical reasoning might not be thought to apply equally well to moral 
thinking. For an interesting discussion of whether Aristotle, for example, intended his theory 
of the practical syllogism to apply to moral reasoning, see J. COOPER, REASON AND HUMAN 
Gooo IN ARISTOTLE 1-88 (1975). See generally the essays collected in PRACTICAL REASONING 
(J. Raz ed. 1978). An account of practical thinking might instead be intended as a description 
of how we decide upon any action and/or as a theory whereby our actions may be justified, 
MacCormick is never fully clear about the role he attributes to practical reason. 
2. "[I]t is therefore sometimes the case that a legal conclusion can be validly derived by 
deductive logic from the proposition of law and the proposition of fact which serve as prem-
ises" (pp. 36-37). 
3. MacCormick describes two general sorts of problems that prevent rules from compelling 
any particular decision even when the facts are not in issue. The first of these, "the problem of 
interpretation," occurs when a rule is in some respect ambiguous. For example, a revenue 
statute that directs "All scholarships shall be excluded from taxable income," is, in and of 
itself, ambiguous since no meaning is ascribed to "scholarship." This problem arises because 
general terms tend to have fuzzy edges - borderlines where applicability of the term to the 
circumstances is not clear. The effect of this fact on the law was at least suggested by Plato, see 
PLATO, REPUBLIC IV, 425 b-e, and was explicitly developed by Aristotle, see ARISTOTLE, 
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS V, 1137 b 11-24. It has been developed in a modem context by H.L.A. 
Hart. See H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 123-32 (1961). 
MacCormick denominates his second sort of problem "the problem of relevancy." Here 
the question is whether, for some given set of facts "p" and for some remedy "q" sought by one 
of the parties, there is a relevant general legal rule "If p then q." When an American court 
entertains a motion for summary judgment it must answer exactly this kind of question. 
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83).4 Sometimes judges self-consciously try to frame such a general 
rule before rendering a decision, and sometimes they render the par-
ticular decision first and the rule must be supplied later (pp. 83-85). 5 
The order of proceeding does not change the logical relationship be-
tween rules, facts, and decisions. Yet the observation that judges 
create general legal rules through their decisions does not mean that 
judges have unfettered discretion to make whatever decisions they 
wish. Even though at the outset a judge may not be logically com-
pelled by any legal rule to render a particular decision, his choice of 
general legal rules is circumscribed by the requirements that (1) his 
particular decision be logically consistent with the body of general 
rules that compose the legal system (pp. 106, 196) and that (2) the 
general rule join the set of all other general rules to form a "coher-
ent" legal system. Coherency is a f~irly vague notion requiring, at 
least, that the policies and purposes that apparently underlie the in-
dividual rules not controvert one another (pp. 106-07, 152-53). 
Within these constraints, however, a judge is free to ground either 
his choice of general rule or his particular decision on his judgment 
about the generalized consequences of his choice or decision (pp. 
163-66). His "consequentalist arguments" (MacCormick is careful to 
distinguish his rather broad and imprecise use of this phrase from 
utilitarianism) may take into account a variety of considerations, in-
cluding justice, common sense, public benefit, and convenience (pp. 
105-06, 115-19). Thus his "final judgment [is] passed in summation 
of the cumulating or competing results of evaluation by reference to 
a number of criteria of value ... " (p. 115).6 Reason, concludes 
4. I have stated this element of his thesis rather differently from MacCormick, but I think 
that it is an accurate representation. He appeals to the importance of "formal justice" - the 
principle that we treat like cases alike - in the justification of any legal decision, to argue that 
any decision entails that any like case would be identically decided. 
5. See R. WASSERSTROM, THE JUDICIAL DECISION 19-20 (1961). 
6. MacCormick calls this process of justifying a choice between possible rulings "second-
order justification." He notes that it is importantly like the theory of the justification of the 
choice between rival scientific hypotheses that has been set forth by Sir Karl Popper, Thomas 
Kuhn, and others. In both contexts, the choice of general principle is made within, and is 
constrained by, the system within which it occurs. He does not observe, however, that this 
same "mode of argument" has been advanced, as well, in both moral and legal philosophy. 
Joel Feinberg;in a review of John Rawls's A Theory of Justice, describes the view particularly 
clearly: 
Rawls shares a conception of the modes of argument available to the moral philoso-
pher with a growing number of other writers. [Here Feinberg cites, among others, Aris-
totle, William James, Morton White, Israel Scheffler, Rolf Sartorious, and himself]. 
Perhaps the least misleading label for the conception would be "the coherence theory." 
The writers to whom I refer have been disillusioned with various traditional modes of 
argument in moral philosophy. They do not believe it possible to base an ethical system 
on self-evident moral first principles, or on direct intuitive insight into, or rational appre-
hension of, a uniquely moral realm of truth. Nor do they think it possible to deduce 
moral first principles from statements of facts, making no challengeable moral assump-
tions along the way. On the other hand, these writers are not willing to deprive general 
principles of their usual role in arguments for relatively specific maxims and judgments. 
General principles and factual premises do entail specific moral judgments they admit, 
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MacCormick, may not determine, but it does strictly limit the gen-
eral legal rules that together can constitute a legal system. "Thus, it 
is that we can have rationally structured but not rationally deter-
mined legal systems, and indeed 'systems' or 'theories' of morality 
(as distinct from theories about morality)" (p. 271). 
To anyone familiar with the literature of contemporary philoso-
phy oflaw, this summary should make it apparent that MacCormick 
is in part attempting to develop, within an essentially Hartian frame-
work,7 a response to Dworkin's challenge to modem positivism.8 It 
should also be apparent that MacCormick's account of the structure 
of legal reasoning is at least reminiscent of - if not inspired by -
Richard Wasserstrom's study of the subject published nineteen years 
ago.9 MacCormick acknowledges, of course, his debts to Hart (p. 
231) and Wasserstrom (p. 116) and the fact that, in response to 
Dworkin, he hopes to extend the "ambit" of the positivists' inquiry 
from an excessive concentration on legal rules to a fuller explanation 
of other normative standards in the law (p. 239). Yet MacCormick's 
accounts of Hart's and Dworkin's views are so sketchy that, in the 
case of Hart, only a reader exceedingly familar with The Concept of 
Law could make much of a beginning at laying out the parameters 
of this positivism whose "ambit" is being extended and, that in the 
case of Dworkin (whose arguments receive their principal summary 
on one page -p. 230), no one relying on this book alone would fully 
understand its motivation or point. MacCormick's explicit discus-
sion of Hart and Dworkin is expansive, however, when compared to 
the few lines that he devotes to Wasserstrom's "brilliant pioneering 
study'' (p. 116). 
Despite MacCormick's parsimonious description of the work of 
others, his style is by no means generally terse. Quite the contrary. 
After a brief introductory chapter, the book is launched by a 34-page 
chapter on deductive justification. The point of the chapter is vari-
but the most suitable general principles, they insist, are those that summarize and are 
supported by the specific moral judgments in which we have the most confidence. We 
justify specific moral judgments, on their view, by deriving them from general principles, 
and the latter are supported in tum by a demonstration that the right moral Judgments 
(other moral judgments) follow from them. This may be circular, but it is unavoidably 
and non-viciously so. 
Feinberg, Justice, Fairness and Rationality, 81 YALE L.J. 1004, 1019 (1972). 
See Scheffler, On Justtfication and Commitment, 51 J. PHIL. 180 (1954), and Sartorious, The 
Justtfication of the Judicial JJecision, 18 ETHICS 171 (1968). 
1. See generally H.L.A. HART, supra note 3. 
8. See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (paperback ed. 1978), which is a collec-
tion of Dworkin's articles. It includes as an appendix a revised version of Dworkin, Seven 
Critics, lI GA. L. REv. 1201 (1977), Dworkin's response to critics of the hardbound edition of 
his book. 
For a sympathetic account of some of Dworkin's views, which is in certain respects sub-
stantially clearer and more convincing than anything Dworkin himself has published, see Re-
gan, Glosses on JJworkin, 16 MICH. L. R.Ev. 1213 (1978). 
9. R. WASSERSTROM, supra note 5. 
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ously described as being "[t]o demonstrate the possibility of [a] 
purely deductive justification" (p. 19)10 of a legal decision and to 
answer "those who deny that deductive logic is relevant to the justifi-
cation oflegal decisions . . ." (p. 45). 11 Under either description, the 
project is hardly controversial; it merely analyzes the logical struc-
ture of the opinion in J)aniels and J)aniels v. R White & Sons and 
Tarbard ([1938] 4 All E.R. 258), a very straightforward products lia-
bility case in which neither the law nor the facts were at issue. 12 
MacCormick analyzes the few paragraphs of Justice Lewis's opinion 
at an excruciatingly slow pace, punctuating his analysis with what is 
supposed to be a lesson in elementary logic. Sadly, the lesson is 
marred by its inaccuracy. Nothing very much hinges on Mac-
Cormick's mistakes, but under the circumstances the patient reader 
ought at least to be able to rely on MacCormick to get the story 
right.13 
MacCormick wants to show that some legal arguments take the 
form: 
I) p::,q (If p then q) 
2) p (p) 
3) :.q (Therefore q) 
To this end, he takes the language of Justice Lewis in Daniels, ex-
pands it to fill in all the unstated (because obvious) premises, and 
expresses each statement symbolically (p. 30). Surprisingly, he trans-
lates sentences like "If [any] one person transfers the property in 
goods to another person for a money consideration, then a contract 
IO. See also pp. 21, 37, and 52. 
I I. See also p. 52. 
12. There is a long tradition, particularly in American jurisprudence, oflegal philosophers 
and jurists who have argued either that judges do not in fact decide cases by means of a 
deductive procedure, that they should not, or that their decisions cannot in fact be so justified. 
E.g., J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1948); 0.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 
(1881); E. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REAsoNING (1961). The claims have taken 
various forms, but I have never seen it seriously contended that a judge could never set forth 
an account of his decision which was purely deductive in form. MacCormick cites no one. 
For a very clear discussion of the distinctions that should be drawn in this area, see R. WAs-
SERSTROM, supra note 5, at 12-38. 
13. For example, MacCormick writes: 
At least since the time of Aristotle, it has been recognized that an argument of the 
form 'If p then q, p, therefore q' is a valid deductive argument; the logicians of the Stoic 
school who came after him gave that form of valid inference the name 'modus ponens.' 
But full understanding of propositional logic did not come until the present century, when 
Russell and Whitehead and others [and here MacCormick cites Wittgenstein] worked out 
a systematic account of the 'calculus of propositions' [p. 24]. 
The use of "modus ponens" in argument predated Aristotle, but he did not acknowledge the 
logical principles upon which he relied. Nevertheless, Aristotle was the first clearly to distin-
guish arguments from the conditional propositions that appear in them and to recognize cer-
tain inference patterns-such as "ifp then q, p, therefore q" -as valid without proof. See J. 
-1::.UKASIEWICZ, ARISTOTLE'S SYLLOGISTIC FROM THE STANDPOINT OF MODERN FORMAL 
LOGIC 1-3 (2d ed. 1957); B. MATES, STOIC LOGIC 1-4 (1961); Mueller, An Introduction to Stoic 
Logic, in THE STOICS 1-8 (J. Rist ed. 1978). Nor were Russell and Whitehead the first to 
systematize the propositional calculus. It was fully systematized by Frege more than 30 years 
earlier in his BEGRIFFSSCHRIFT (1879). 
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of sale of those goods exists as between those parties" as "p=>q,'' 
rather than as some kind of universally quantified conditional (i.e., 
"For all people, if one person transfers the property etc., then a con-
tract of sale exists'' or, symbolically, (x) (If Fx then Gx)). This fail-
ure to employ universal quantifiers makes MacCormick's 
symbolization of the argument misleading. The second sentence of 
the argument is "In the instant case, one person [i.e., Mrs. Tarbard] 
transferred the property in goods to another person for a money con-
sideration.'' This is represented by MacCormick simply as "p,U 
when in fact it is not identical with the premise "p'' in the sentence 
that he translated as "p=>q.'' MacCormick has left out the step, 
sometimes called "universal instantiation,'' whereby the assertion 
that for all cases some proposition holds ((x) (If Fx then Gx)) leads 
to the assertion that in some particular circumstance the same propo-
sition holds (If Fa then Ga). Here, to adopt MacCormick's lan-
guage, the second sentence should be, "If, in the instant case, one 
person [i.e., Mrs. Tarbard] transferred the property in goods to an-
other person for a money consideration, then a contract of sale of 
goods existed between Mrs. Tarbard and that person." Mac-
Cormick's second sentence would then serve as the third sentence in 
the argument. It might be symbolized as "Fa." His conclusion to 
this part of the argument is then warranted by the premises: "In the 
instant case a contract of sale of those goods existed as between those 
parties" (Ga). 
The lack of precision which characterizes the chapter oh deduc-
tive justification is characteristic of much of the general argument of 
the book.14 Nonetheless, this is a book with one great virtue. It is a 
book that almost passionately sets forth an insight - perhaps correct 
and certainly interesting - about the role of reason in practical deci-
sion making. Reason does not determine the content of our norma-
tive principles (legal or moral) but it does limit it. Human beings, as 
a species, simply do strive to be rational (pp. 268-70) and thus they 
select and frame normative principles which are consistent with one 
another and which together are "coherent" (pp. 265-71). This in-
sight is hardly original with MacCormick, 15 but its full-scale, self-
conscious application to legal theory is his contribution. I wish that 
he had done a better and more careful job. 
14. See notes I, 3, 4, 6 & 12 supra. 
15. Cf. note 6 supra. I would argue, contrary to the standard interpretation adopted by 
MacCormick, that Hume had much this same insight about the role of reason in normative 
thought. See also Frankena, "Ought" and "Is" Once More, 2 MAN AND WORLD 515 (1969), 
reprinted in PERSPECTIVES ON MORALITY (K. Goodpaster ed. 1976). 
